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WHO OWNS MY DONATED TISSUE?  THE PUBLIC’S PROSTATE 
INFLAMMATION: A CASENOTE ON WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY v. 
CATALONA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“It’s been in there for a year, and it’s ghastly.”1  Larry Johnson, former 
executive of Alcor Life Extension Foundation, was referring to the cryonically 
frozen head of former Major League Baseball player, Ted Williams.  At death, 
Williams purportedly had his head and body frozen separately in the hopes that 
future technological advancements could resurrect him.2  However, serious 
doubts exist as to whether Williams ever intended to be placed in such a 
facility.3  Further, one can be sure he never meant for someone to refer to his 
frozen, decapitated head as “ghastly.”4  Is there a remedy at this point?  Does 
the Williams family have control over his body?  Should Williams even be 
classified as dead?5  Instead, presume Williams donated his head for research 
(premised on grounds he might want it back someday), does it then follow that 
once the donation is made, he loses all ownership rights to that donation?   
Ted Williams’ head is an abstract (albeit grotesque) analogy to Washington 
University v. Catalona, a case currently pending in United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.6  The issue in Catalona is whether donors of 
prostate tissue samples for research purposes have any rights to those tissues 
once the physical donation has been made.7  Catalona’s importance cannot be 
understated.  According to one observer, “[T]he Catalona case raises a series 
 
 1. Richard Sandomir, Ted Williams Tale Gets Stranger by the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2003, at D2 (quoting Larry Johnson, former Chief Operating Officer of Alcor Life Extension 
Foundation). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Tom Verducci, What Really Happened to Ted Williams: A Year after the Jarring News 
that the Splendid Splinter was being Frozen in a Cryonics Lab, New Details, Including a 
Decapitation, Suggest that One of America’s Greatest Heroes May Never Rest in Peace, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 18, 2003, at 66. 
 4. Sandomir, supra note 1. 
 5. See Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575-576 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992) (The court did not rule out the possibility of revival of cryonically frozen bodies, but 
stated that “those persons who will then head our various branches of government will be far 
wiser than we and entirely capable of resolving such dilemmatic issues without our assistance.”). 
 6. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 7. Id. at 987. 
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of questions whose answers will shape the evolving law of research on body 
tissue.”8  More importantly, this case’s outcome will affect more than just a 
handful of people.  According to a 1999 report by the RAND Corporation, over 
307 million tissue samples from more than 178 million people were stored in 
the United States, increasing by a rate of 20 million samples each year.9  The 
samples are collected from routine medical tests, operations, clinical trials, and 
research donations, such as the one presently in question.10  Thus, Catalona 
has the potential to be a “landmark” case in the field of property rights and 
biological materials.11 
In order to investigate Catalona’s potential impact, the case will have to be 
examined.  First, the case’s basic facts will be laid out.  Second, various 
property arguments will be examined including whether exclusive possession 
and control of a biological sample determines ownership and whether the 
donations were inter vivos gifts or bailments.  Clarifying the property rights 
issues will be helpful but not determinative.  Finally, the fact that tissue 
donations are biological materials further complicates matters because federal 
regulations will be implicated, at least to some extent, if the research involves 
human subjects.  But does research involving stored tissue constitute research 
involving human subjects?  Would severing any identifying informational ties 
linking the sample to the donor (a process called anonymization) eliminate the 
involvement of human subjects?  If not, donors must give informed consent 
prior to participating in the research.  However, it is often unclear as to what 
exactly they are consenting.  Ambiguity also exists as to what should happen 
when participants decide to withdraw from the research.  What happens to a 
donor’s unused samples?  An examination of all of the above questions will 
hopefully clarify the case of Washington University v. Catalona. 
 
 8. Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body?  A Patient’s Perspective on Washington 
University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 399-400 (2006).  In fact, Andrews’ article 
included a bit of the history of a patient owning his own tissue outside of his body.  Id. at 400.  
She stated that the common law did not allow people to have property rights to their body.  Id.  
Interestingly, she stated, “[T]he common law basis for preventing people from voluntarily 
transferring their body parts . . . may not have its roots in the view that the body is sacred and that 
people should not be objectified as property.  Rather, it may arise from the notion that people’s 
bodies were the property of the Crown.”  Id.  If they maimed their body, they could not fight for 
the king.  Id.  That ended by 1804, apparently, as her research uncovered a story from England in 
1804 where a creditor arrested a dead body for a debt.  Id. 
 9. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at § 6.  Doing the 
math, there should be 467 million tissue samples in the U.S. by 2007.  Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY V. CATALONA—WHAT 
HAPPENED? 
A. Facts of the Case 
Washington University (WU) is a private research university with a 
medical school which includes the Division of Urologic Surgery.12  William 
Catalona (Catalona), an urologist, surgeon, and researcher, worked in the 
Urology Division at WU from 1976 to 2003,13 and he was Chief of the 
Division from 1984 to 1998.14  Catalona’s research focused on prostate cancer, 
and through thousands of surgeries at WU, he collected many research samples 
from the excised, cancerous tissues of patients.15  Some of those patients 
became research participants (RPs) and subsequently plaintiffs in the case at 
bar.  The patients’ samples were stored in the Genito-Urinary Biorepository 
(Biorepository), which Catalona was “instrumental” in establishing.16 
The Biorepository is operated by WU and is used strictly for research 
purposes.17  WU employees administer it, and WU provides the majority of 
funding to operate and maintain it.18  The Biorepository holds “biological 
specimens of prostate tissue, blood, and DNA samples . . .” collected not only 
from Catalona’s surgeries but also from other WU physicians and outside 
researchers, as well.19  Of the 30,000 research participants in prostate cancer 
studies, only about 3,000 were patients of Catalona, and those patients only 
donated a total of 3,500 prostate tissue samples.20 
WU has instituted a process to distribute samples from the Biorepository to 
outside researchers.  In 2002, WU created a Peer Review Panel which handled 
all sample requests from the Biorepository, including those from researchers 
outside WU.21  Prior to leaving WU, Catalona submitted three sample requests 
that were approved, but he did not subsequently request any other samples via 
the Peer Review Panel.22 
 
 12. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  It is interesting to note that the research participants (RPs) in this case were patients 
of Catalona, and they referred to themselves collectively as “patients,” not “research 
participants,” in all of their briefs.  However, since the district court referred to them as RPs 
throughout its opinion, that is how they will be referred to here. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 989. 
 18. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
 19. Id. at 988-89. 
 20. Id. at 988-89. 
 21. Id. at 993. 
 22. Id. at 993-94. 
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Further research institutions have procured research samples from the 
Biorepository, subject to Material Transfer Agreements (MTA).23 The MTAs 
were required for studies which occurred either outside of or in partnership 
with WU.24  Seven MTAs, signed by Catalona himself, acknowledged WU as 
the owner of the samples.25  In one instance, Catalona attempted to change the 
MTA to assert co-ownership of the samples with WU, but when WU refused to 
alter it, Catalona signed it nonetheless.26 
WU had an Intellectual Property Policy, which stated: 
[A]ll intellectual property (including. . .tangible research property) shall be 
owned by [WU] if significant [WU] resources were used or if it is created 
pursuant to a research project funded through corporate, federal, or other 
external sponsors administered by [WU] . . . .[G]enerally, creators and research 
investigators will retain custody of tangible research property while at [WU].27 
As defined, “tangible research property” includes biological materials, owned 
by WU per the agreement.28  Both the Intellectual Property Policy and the 
MTAs were used as evidence to show that WU had held the property rights to 
the samples, not the RPs or Catalona.29 
RPs in WU studies had to sign “informed consent” forms, which bore the 
WU logo.30  The forms stated that the RPs could not claim ownership rights to 
any product resulting from the research.31  The forms further stated that the 
biological donations were “a free and generous gift of [blood, tissue, and/or 
DNA] to research that may benefit others.”32  The forms also provided for 
withdrawal from research, stating “you may choose not to participate in this 
research study or withdraw your consent at any time.”33  The forms were silent 
on the issue of whether RPs could withdraw their previously-donated samples 
or transfer them to another facility.34  However, testimony at trial showed that 
once RPs chose to withdraw from participation, WU had three options 
concerning the previously-donated tissue: destroy the samples, store them 
indefinitely, or “anonymize” them.35 
 
 23. Id. at 989. 
 24. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 995. 
 27. Id. at 989 (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17, § I.3(a)). 
 28. Id. at 995. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 992.  In anonymizing a sample, all information linking the donor to the sample is 
destroyed. Id. at 992, n.10. 
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In addition to the informed consent forms, RPs were also given 
(purportedly to sign) a “WU Genetic Research Brochure,” which stated that if 
an RP decided to withdraw, “you should call the investigator listed on the 
consent form, [y]our tissue will be identified and destroyed upon request,” and 
“any research results already obtained cannot be destroyed or recalled.”36  Like 
the informed consent form, the brochure was silent as to whether RPs could 
withdraw their previously-donated samples or transfer them to another 
facility.37 
In early 2003, Catalona left WU to continue his prostate cancer research at 
Northwestern University.38  Prior to doing so, he sent letters to 60,000 RPs, 
even those that were not his patients, informing them of his intent to leave 
WU.39  Catalona asked the RPs to sign an attached “Medical Consent & 
Authorization” form, which purportedly allowed all samples to be released to 
Catalona.40  Six thousand RPs returned a signed form. 
B. Procedural History 
WU filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Missouri to settle the ownership dispute over the 
samples.41  Catalona was the original defendant, and the RPs later 
intervened.42  Concerning the issue of ownership, the district court held a 
preliminary injunction hearing that included all parties, including the RPs, in 
April 2005.43  A decision on the injunction was issued on March 31, 200644 
and is currently on appeal in the Eighth Circuit.45  Oral arguments concerning 
the appeal were heard on December 13, 2006,46 and an opinion is expected in 
the summer of 2007. 
III.  DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSIONS 
The district court stated that the sole issue in the case was ownership, and 
asked whether “[T]he research participants retain ownership rights in such 
materials in that they can direct said materials’ use and transfer to third-
 
 36. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
 37. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
 38. Id. at 993. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 987. 
 42. Id. at 989 n.5. 
 43. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 44. Id. at 985. 
 45. The case numbers are No.06-2286 and No.06-2301. 
 46. Oral arguments are available for listening online at the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit’s website, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited Jan. 
21, 2007). 
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parties.”47  The court concluded that WU owned the tissues because it had 
exclusive possession and control over them, and the RPs had not produced 
sufficient evidence to overcome that.48  With WU having ownership, the RPs 
retained no right to transfer.49  Further, the court found that the WU obtained 
the samples via inter vivos gifts, not as bailments as the RPs had suggested.50  
However, the issues in this case were clouded because there were special 
considerations concerning biological materials, such as informed consent 
forms and a RP’s right to discontinue participation in research. 
IV.  PROPERTY ARGUMENTS: DOES EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND CONTROL 
DETERMINE OWNERSHIP?  DID WU ACQUIRE SUCH POSSESSION VIA INTER 
VIVOS GIFTS OR BAILMENTS? 
The sole issue in Catalona is whether WU or the RPs own the tissue 
samples, and to what extent.  The fact that the samples in question are 
biological materials will cloud the analysis of ownership and control, but a 
proper analysis begins by first examining the issue as if the samples were 
general personal property.  Next, the issue of how property is transferred via an 
inter vivos gift will be examined.  The last property-based argument to be 
discussed is an alternative legal explanation that the samples instead were 
bailments, with WU as bailee. 
A. Property Ownership, Generally 
Property ownership is relatively straightforward.  In Missouri, where the 
events in Catalona occurred, a prima facie case of ownership is established by 
meeting both requirements of a two-part test: (1) exclusive possession and (2) 
control of the personal property.51  The non-possessor bears the burden of 
establishing ownership by a preponderance of the evidence.52  For example, in 
Foltz v. Pipes, two brothers argued over the ownership of a coin.53  Since the 
defendant brother had exclusive possession and control of the coin, the court 
held he had prima facie evidence of ownership.54  The plaintiff could not meet 
his burden of establishing ownership by a preponderance of the evidence.55 
In Catalona, the court framed the issue as whether the RPs retained 
ownership rights of their samples to such an extent that they could transfer 
 
 47. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 48. Id. at 997. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 997, 1001. 
 51. Id. at 994 (citing Foltz v. Pipes, 800 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Foltz, 800 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 54. Id. at 15. 
 55. Id. 
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them to third parties.56  The court noted that Missouri law governs the 
substantive issues of property ownership, and followed the two-part test of 
exclusive possession and control.57  The court concluded that WU had been in 
exclusive possession of the samples, and that this point was undisputed.58  
Further, WU owned, maintained, and funded a majority of the Biorepository.59  
The court also concluded that WU had control over the samples, too.60  WU 
controlled who had access to the samples and bore “all legal, regulatory, and 
compliance risks,” and WU was responsible for complying with all federal and 
state laws and regulations.61 
The court stressed that WU had continually asserted its ownership in the 
samples, first in its Intellectual Property Policy (IPP) and again in its MTAs.62  
The IPP stated that tangible research property “shall be owned by [WU] if 
significant [WU] resources were used.”63  The MTAs also acknowledged WU 
as the owner of samples, and WU refused Catalona’s request to assert co-
ownership over them,64  Catalona signed the MTAs, nonetheless.65  Thus, 
WU’s strongest claim was possession,66 and the court concluded that WU had 
exclusive possession and control over the samples.67  Having possession and 
control established, the next issue was how WU acquired the samples—were 
they inter vivos gifts or bailments? 
B. Inter Vivos Gifts 
The next issue discussed in WU v. Catalona was whether the samples 
constituted an inter vivos gift from the RPs, and if so, to whom.68  In Missouri, 
an inter vivos gift of personal property requires three elements: 1) the donor’s 
present intention to make a gift; 2) delivery of the property by the donor to the 
donee; 3) acceptance by the donee.69  Upon acceptance, the donee takes 
ownership “immediately and absolutely.”70  The donee has the burden of 
proving ownership with clear and convincing evidence, which can be 
 
 56. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 994-95. 
 62. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 995. 
 63. Id. at 989. 
 64. Id. at 995. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Andrews, supra note 8, at 402. 
 67. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Duvall v. Henke, 749 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 70. Id. 
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determined not only through specific language, but also by examining the 
circumstances surrounding the action.71 
In Catalona, the court found the circumstances surrounding the donations 
constituted clear and convincing evidence that the RPs made inter vivos gifts 
to WU.72  First, the court found that the informed consent forms showed the 
RPs had the present intention to make a gift.73  The forms, bearing the WU 
logo, did not state that Catalona would have sole possession of the samples, 
and they included language that the research would be conducted by “Catalona 
and/or colleagues.”74  Moreover, the forms used the term “donation,” and at 
least some of the forms referenced a waiver of claims to the samples.75  Thus, 
present intent to make a donation was clear, and since a completed inter vivos 
gift cannot be revoked, the RPs’ desires to later transfer the samples were 
merely “afterthought[s] of regret.”76  Thus, the court found the RPs had the 
present intent to make a gift.77  Second, it was undisputed that the RPs 
“delivered” the property, presumably since they had possession of the samples 
before surgery, and following surgery WU had possession.  Lastly, the court 
found that WU accepted the samples by placing them in the Biorepository and 
claiming ownership.78  Thus, the court concluded that the RPs donated their 
samples as inter vivos gifts, which could not be revoked. 
The RPs had a counterargument, though.  First, the RPs that testified 
denied making an unconditional gift, and Catalona denied receiving an 
unconditional gift.79  The RPs argued that conditions attached to the donation 
that afforded the RPs additional rights in the samples.80  Thus, the RPs argued 
that even if the donations were characterized as gifts, they were conditional 
gifts whose conditions would not be satisfied with WU as the owner.81  The 
RPs claimed they went to WU merely to see Catalona; as such, the gifts were 
made on the condition that Catalona and his designees would use the samples, 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 999. 
 76. Id. at 999.  The court showed some empathy for the RPs attempt to help Catalona 
retrieve their samples, but then the court discredited their testimonies by implying a bias due to a 
“deep personal connection to Dr. Catalona” because he saved their lives.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 998.  However, the court noted that the informed consent forms were 
“inconsequential” because a gift does not require written documentation; federal regulations 
required it here, though, because it concerned a biological material.  Id.  Curiously, the court’s 
opinion suggested that the finding of intent was based mostly on these “inconsequential” 
informed consent forms, restating no other evidence. 
 78. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 79. Andrews, supra note 8, at 402. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 403. 
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not WU.82  With Catalona gone, WU could not meet that condition.83  The RPs 
supported their argument by noting that Catalona was an “internationally 
known prostate cancer surgeon and researcher.”84  A brief glance at Catalona’s 
website confirmed his notoriety; he developed the PSA screening test for 
prostate cancer.85  It would be absurd to question his skill or accomplishments 
as a surgeon and researcher.  But did Catalona’s skill mean that the RPs 
wanted only him to use their tissues in research, as opposed to WU?  One 
observer believed so, analogizing that “just because a person trusts his son to 
drive his car, despite the fact that the son might get in an accident, does not 
mean that the person has given up ownership of the car or that the person is 
indifferent to who drives his car.”86 
C. Bailment 
The RPs, however, did not believe they made inter vivos gifts to WU.  
Instead, they argued the samples were bailments, not gifts, and WU was 
merely a bailee.87  A bailment is “a contract resulting from the delivery of 
goods by bailor to bailee on condition that they be restored to the bailor . . . 
[once] the purposes for which they were bailed are answered.”88  In other 
words, a bailment occurs when one party hands possession of personal 
property to another with the expectation that it will be returned in the future.89  
A bailment can be expressed or implied.90  The RPs have since made the 
analogy (during oral arguments on appeal) to the United Parcel Service, noting 
that with packages, there is a bailment relationship even though the customer 
has no expectation of return.91  If the donations were bailments, then the RPs 
could retain ownership rights of the samples even after WU took possession. 
The District Court rejected the RPs’ bailment argument, noting that they 
had no expectation of having the samples returned, nor was any evidence 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 398. 
 85. Dr. Catalona – Prostate Cancer, PSA Study, and Nerve Sparing Prostate Surgery, 
http://www.drcatalona.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). 
 86. Andrews, supra note 8, at 401. 
 87. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. 
 88. Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. 1998). 
 89. SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MICHAEL 
BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW 30 (West Group 2d ed. 1998). 
 90. Id. at 31.  The authors gave an example of a person tossing car keys to another.  Id.  
Although not expressed, a court would imply a bailment, guessing that there was a change in 
possession with the expectation to have the car returned.  Id. 
 91. Recordings of Oral Arguments, Washington Univ. v. Catalona, No. 06-2286, 06-2301 
(8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2007). 
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presented to that effect92  The court concluded the sample donations were not 
bailments.93  However, the RPs were not finished arguing for ownership or 
recognition of a bailment, addressing the elephant in the room—that these 
samples were not simple personal property but instead biological materials. 
V.  FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: IF THE RESEARCH 
INVOLVES HUMAN SUBJECTS, THEN RESEARCHERS MUST OBTAIN INFORMED 
CONSENT AND ALLOW THE PARTICIPANT TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
FROM THE STUDY 
A wide range of special considerations exist in cases involving biological 
materials. These include the protection of human subjects, informed consent, 
and the right to discontinue participation, each of which is subject to some 
form of federal regulation.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) oversees the protection of human research subjects, issuing 
federal regulations known informally as the “Common Rule.”94  The Office of 
Human Research Protection (OHRP) is responsible for enforcing these DHHS 
regulations by investigating complaints and conducting audits.95  The OHRP 
has a duty to protect volunteers in research supported by DHHS.96 
Federal regulations are important in research.  A Consensus Statement 
printed in the Journal of the American Medical Association stated, “[M]uch 
weight is given to federal regulations regarding the protection of human 
subjects both because they are legally enforceable and because they are the 
embodiment of an attempt to strike a balance between the desire to increase 
knowledge and the protection of individual interests.”97  Although the court’s 
decision had an emphasis on property law, federal regulation played a role in 
that decision.  First, however, it must be determined that the federal regulations 
apply in this case.  Following that, specific federal regulations will be 
 
 92. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. 
 93. Id. at 1001. 
 94. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST & 
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 420 n.1 (5th ed. 2004). 
 95. Id. at 421 n.7. 
 96. OHRP Fact Sheet, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ohrpfactsheet.htm (last visited Jan. 
21, 2007). 
 97. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Consensus Statement, Informed Consent for Genetic 
Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1787 (Dec. 13, 1995).  The article clarifies 
the authors of the article, “A WORKSHOP consisting of scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and 
consumers was convened jointly by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on July 7 and 8, 1994, at the NIH to develop 
recommendations for securing appropriate informed consent when collecting tissue samples for 
possible use in genetic research and for defining indications for additional consent if samples in 
hand are to be used for genetic studies.  The analysis that follows represents the consensus of the 
individuals listed . . . (although not all signers agreed with every point) and is not the official 
policy of the NIH and the CDC.”  Id. at 1786. 
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examined, including those on informed consent and the right to discontinue or 
withdraw from participation in research. 
A. Threshold Issue: Do Federal Regulations Apply to Catalona? 
Both WU and the research itself must meet certain criteria in order for the 
Common Rule, concerning research on human tissues, to apply.  The 
requirements for application of the Common Rule can be found directly in the 
Code of Federal Regulations, which states: 
[T]his policy applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, 
supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or 
agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make the policy 
applicable to such research.98 
Relative to Catalona, two particular aspects need to be examined.  First, was 
WU’s research “conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any 
federal department or agency” (i.e. is WU subject to federal regulation?), and 
second, did the research conducted on stored prostate tissue samples involve 
human subjects? 
1. Is Washington University subject to the Federal regulations? 
Technically, the Common Rule only applies to research either funded by 
the federal government or subject to federal regulation.99  Often, however, as a 
condition of receiving any federal funding, an academic institution must agree 
to apply the Common Rule to all academic research.100  This is done using a 
formal agreement called an assurance, which requires institutions (like 
Washington University, for example) to comply with the Common Rule.101  
The academic institution makes the assurance to the DHHS (via the OHRP).102  
In the assurance, the institution agrees to follow DHHS regulations in all 
research, even projects not federally funded or otherwise subject to federal 
regulation.103  The OHRP has the authority to take action in response to 
violations of the assurance, but in Catalona, it took no action against WU.104  
Neither WU nor the RPs directly objected that the Common Rule did not apply 
to WU. 
 
 98. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005). 
 99. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 420 n.1. 
 100. Id. 
 101. OHRP Fact Sheet, supra note 95. 
 102. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 420 n.1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
368 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:357 
2. Does research on stored human tissue involve “human subjects?”  If 
so, does severing the informational link between a sample and Its 
donor change the result? 
In order for research to be subject to federal regulation, it must involve 
“human subjects.”105  It would be difficult to deny that the RPs were not 
human subjects at the time the tissue was removed and donated, especially 
after hearing their testimony in this case.  However, an indirect, unstated 
argument laid beneath the surface.  In testimony at trial, WU stated that one 
option it had concerning the previously-donated tissue samples was to 
“anonymize” them.106  In anonymizing a sample, all identifying information 
linking the donor to the sample is destroyed.107  The argument is that once 
identifying information was removed, the sample no longer involved a human 
subject because it could not be traced back to any particular person.108 
This indirect argument that anonymizing a sample would exclude it from 
the Common Rule109 has some basis in the Code of Federal Regulations: 
(b) Unless otherwise required by department or agency heads, research 
activities in which the only involvement of human subjects will be in one or 
more of the following categories are exempt from this policy: 
. . . . 
(4) Research, involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, 
records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources 
are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator 
in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subjects.110 
Thus, two criteria exist for the use of anonymous samples.111  First, the 
samples must already exist at the beginning of the research; second, identifiers 
linking the subjects to their samples must be removed.112  If both elements are 
met, then a human subject is no longer involved.113  The effect is that the 
Common Rule would not apply, and informed consent would not be 
required.114  The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), created 
 
 105. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2006). 
 106. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992. 
 107. Id. at 992, n.10. 
 108. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 15 (1999). 
 109. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 398 n.1. 
 110. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 111. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787. 
 112. Id. 
 113. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 15. 
 114. Id. 
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by former President Bill Clinton,115 seemed to agree, stating that as long as 
those two requirements are met, the Common Rule permits researchers to take 
and use samples, even without a subject’s consent.116 
It is not clear how complete the severance must be, though.  Some claim 
that it must be “impossible under any circumstances to identify the individual 
source” of the sample, and that even the institution must not have the ability to 
do so.117  However, this may be an extreme view.  New guidance from the 
OHRP suggested that when the sample has been coded and the researcher does 
not have access to the key, then it would no longer involve a human subject.118  
The OHRP’s guidance on the subject stated: 
OHRP does not consider research involving only coded private information or 
specimens to involve human subjects as defined under 45 CFR 46.102(f) if the 
following conditions are both met: 
(1) the private information or specimens were not collected specifically for the 
currently proposed research project through an interaction or intervention with 
living individuals; and 
 
 115. Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (Oct. 3, 1995).  The NBAC’s functions 
included: 
(a) NBAC shall provide advice and make recommendations to the National Science and 
Technology Council and to other appropriate government entities regarding the following 
matters: (1) the appropriateness of departmental, agency, or other governmental programs, 
policies, assignments, missions, guidelines, and regulations as they relate to bioethical 
issues arising from research on human biology and behavior; and (2) applications, 
including the clinical applications, of that research.  (b) NBAC shall identify broad 
principles to govern the ethical conduct of research, citing specific projects only as 
illustrations for such principles.  (c) NBAC shall not be responsible for the review and 
approval of specific projects.  (d) In addition to responding to requests for advice and 
recommendations from the National Science and Technology Council, NBAC also may 
accept suggestions of issues for consideration from both the Congress and the public. 
NBAC also may identify other bioethical issues for the purpose of providing advice and 
recommendations, subject to the approval of the National Science and Technology 
Council. 
60 Fed. Reg. at 52,063-64. 
Incidentally, the current NBAC was created in 2001 by President George W. Bush as the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, advising him on bioethical issues that emerge “as a 
consequence of advances in biomedical science and technology.”  Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66 
Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001).  The Council does not oversee regulations for government 
agencies; its purpose is solely to advise the President.  Id.  The NBAC was renewed through 
September 29, 2007 by Exec. Order No. 13385, Fed. Reg. 57989 (Sept. 29, 2005). 
 116. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, supra note 107, at 16. 
 117. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787. 
 118. Ellen Wright Clayton, Informed Consent and Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16 
(2005). 
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(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the identity of the individual(s) 
to whom the coded private information or specimens pertain because, for 
example: 
(a) the key to decipher the code is destroyed before the research begins; 
(b) the investigators and the holder of the key enter into an agreement 
prohibiting the release of the key to the investigators under any 
circumstances, until the individuals are deceased (note that the HHS 
regulations do not require the IRB to review and approve this agreement); 
(c) there are IRB-approved written policies and operating procedures for a 
repository or data management center that prohibit the release of the key to 
the investigators under any circumstances, until the individuals are 
deceased; or 
(d) there are other legal requirements prohibiting the release of the key to 
the investigators, until the individuals are deceased. 
This guidance applies to existing private information and specimens, as well as 
to private information and specimens to be collected in the future for purposes 
other than the currently proposed research. The following are examples of 
private information or specimens that will be collected in the future for 
purposes other than the currently proposed research: (1) medical records; and 
(2) ongoing collection of specimens for a tissue repository.119 
The OHRP guidance also states that when analyzing whether the research 
involves a human subject, one must focus on what the researcher is 
obtaining.120  “If the [researchers] are not obtaining . . . data through 
intervention or interaction with living individuals . . . then the research activity 
does not involve human subjects.”121  In interpreting the above OHRP’s 
guidance, Ellen Wright Clayton affirmed that the Common Rule does not 
apply to “investigators who receive only coded information so long as they do 
not have access to the key” because the research would not involve human 
subjects.122 
Whether the samples in Catalona would be excluded as research on human 
subjects based on the OHRP’s guidance remains unclear.  At least some 
samples were not collected specifically for the current research, but rather for 
the Biorepository.  If the identifying information were severed from the 
sample, an argument could be made that the research no longer involved 
human subjects. 
 
 119. Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Guidance on Research Involving 
Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ 
humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (emphasis in original). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Clayton, supra note 117, at 16. 
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Even if the research did not involve human subjects, some argue that it 
would be ethically wrong to acquire and anonymize samples without consent 
because researchers would have had the opportunity to get consent; they just 
failed to do so.123  Further, Lori Andrews, a professor of law and Director of 
the Institute for Science, Law and Technology,124 stated that some of the RPs 
objected to anonymization because they claimed that severing the samples 
from identifying information would “reduce the value of their contributions by 
limiting the type of prostate cancer research that could be done and because it 
would prevent the patients from learning specific details of what the research 
had shown in their own tissue.”125  Andrews later argued that patients agreed 
to participate in Catalona’s research with the hope of benefiting “future 
generations of cancer sufferers . . . including family members unlucky enough 
to inherit the genetic risk of developing the disease.”126 
A conclusion on this point has not been reached.127  Nonetheless, regarding 
the Biorepository, WU might be permitted to anonymize the samples without 
consent of the donors, but that argument is closely tied into the basic argument 
in Catalona—that WU has control over the samples. 
3. If a participant dies, does the research still involve a human subject? 
There is one last issue to address stemming from the human subject 
requirement of the Common Rule.128  The Common Rule’s definition of a 
human subject begins with “a living individual . . . .”129  A Consensus 
Statement in the Journal of the American Medical Association might shed light 
on the subject; although the Consensus Statement concerned genetic research, 
it could be applied to other forms of research.130  The authors of the Consensus 
Statement noted that any use of samples from deceased patients is not covered 
by the federal regulations.131  The authors were also quick to point out that 
with genetic research, information could be revealed that “may pose 
psychosocial risks to living relative,” but “[t]he absence of risks to living 
people may justify the use for genetic research of anonymous samples.”132  
 
 123. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788. 
 124. Andrews, supra note 8, at 398 n.2.  Andrews’ career has “focused almost exclusively on 
genetic rights and tissue issues. She has written 10 books and more than 100 articles and legal 
briefs; she has advised Congress, the World Health Organization, the National Institutes of Health 
and 14 foreign countries.”  Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6. 
 125. Andrews, supra note 8, at 399. 
 126. Id. at 403. 
 127. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788. 
 128. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005). 
 129. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2005). 
 130. Clayton et al., supra note 96. 
 131. Id. at 1790. 
 132. Id. 
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The article did not further clarify, but presumably the psychosocial risks would 
involve the fact that donors would not want any genetic disease publicized.  In 
Catalona, the research was not genetic in nature.  However, similar 
psychosocial risks could arise as long as the samples remain linked to a 
specific donor.  Although the Common Rule, on its face, seems to exclude 
samples from deceased donors, the issue has not been decided.133  It is 
plausible that a court would treat the disposition of tissues no differently than 
those from living subjects: destroy them, store them indefinitely, or anonymize 
them. 
B. Two Particular Provisions of the Common Rule: Informed Consent and 
the Right to Withdraw From Participation 
Since federal regulations (including the Common Rule) apply, two 
provisions of particular importance are present in Catalona: informed consent 
and the right to discontinue participation.134 
1. Informed consent.  Is it necessary?  Are there flaws?  Is exculpatory 
language permitted, relieving the researcher from liability? 
a. Informed consent is necessary 
The Common Rule provides a basis for the requirements of informed 
consent, indirectly providing a definition, stating: 
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered 
by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective 
informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only under 
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative 
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that 
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that 
is given to the subject or the representative shall be in language understandable 
to the subject or the representative.135 
Thus, prior to conducting research on human subjects, a researcher must 
provide potential subjects with information about the risks and benefits that 
accompany it.136  Potential subjects can then make an informed decision 
whether to expose themselves to any health and safety risks, in the name of 
research.137  Informed consent had its legal origin in cases involving serious 
physical injury or death; if potential participants fully knew of the risks, they 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (referring to 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005)). 
 135. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 136. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787. 
 137. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] WHO OWNS MY DONATED TISSUE? 373 
may have shied away from participating in the study.138  In Catalona, there 
was no question that informed consent forms were signed by the donors.139 
b. Informed consent has its flaws 
There are concerns with the doctrine of informed consent, however.  When 
there are no physical risks, the scope of informed consent is in question.140  
One court analyzed this by splitting research into two categories: 
nontherapeutic and therapeutic.141  The court, in defining the categories, stated: 
At least to the extent that commercial profit motives are not implicated, 
therapeutic research’s purpose is to directly help or aid a patient who is 
suffering from a health condition the objectives of the research are designed to 
address—hopefully by the alleviation, or potential alleviation, of the health 
condition.  Nontherapeutic research generally utilizes subjects who are not 
known to have the condition the objectives of the research are designed to 
address, and/or is not designed to directly benefit the subjects utilized in the 
research, but, rather, is designed to achieve beneficial results for the public at 
large.142 
With regard to nontherapeutic research, informed consent is necessary.143  By 
contrast, however, much of the risk is eliminated with therapeutic research 
because the primary purpose is to benefit the patient.144  Further, in research 
involving tissue samples obtained from surgeries, nearly all of the risk is 
eliminated because the patients needed the surgeries anyway.145  Requiring 
informed consent in cases with little or no physical risk might seem pointless, 
notwithstanding other types of risk.146  In fact, the NBAC stated, “[W]hen 
important research poses little or no risk to subjects whose consent would be 
difficult or impossible to obtain, it is appropriate to waive the consent 
requirement.”147  Research that poses little or no risk to subjects is rare, if it 
exists at all, but research on stored tissue might come close.  In Catalona, the 
excision of a donor’s cancerous tissue could be seen as therapeutic, and the 
resulting tissue sample as merely a by-product.  Health risks, with respect to 
 
 138. Clayton, supra note 117, at 18. 
 139. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
 140. There are other types of risks in research, such as psychological, social, economic, and 
legal.  For further discussion on these, see CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND 
REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 245 (2005). 
 141. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 n.2 (Md. 2001). 
 142. Id. at 811. 
 143. See Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d 
1340 (4th Cir. 1987) (where the court held that for nontherapeutic research, there is a duty to 
inform the participant of all risks that are reasonably foreseeable). 
 144. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811 n.2. 
 145. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788. 
 146. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 139. 
 147. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 66. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:357 
the research, would be eliminated as the patients’ cancerous excisions would 
have occurred anyway. 
Informed consent has also been questioned when obtaining consent is 
impracticable.148  A Consensus Statement in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, concerning informed consent for stored tissue samples, 
noted that there has been little litigation concerning informed consent and 
impracticability in research.149  The statement stressed, though, “[C]onsent 
cannot be waived on the simple assertion that seeking it would be tedious, 
burdensome or costly.”150  Instead, a balancing test was suggested where the 
burden and cost of obtaining consent would be weighed against the possibility 
that the research might not go forward.151 
Even when informed consent is required, concern exists that the consent 
forms may be inadequate.152  Donors are usually not informed that their 
samples can be retained and used for other studies.153  In fact, the samples may 
be used in research for unrelated purposes at other institutions.154  Some argue 
that an informed consent form should specify whether it includes permission to 
store (and later use) tissue in a biobank.155  Not only would the form enable an 
individual to decide whether to accept certain risks, but it would also “honor” 
the contribution the donor is making.156  However, others argue there is some 
question as to whether a donor should be allowed to give such “blanket consent 
for future research,” given that it may be impossible to make an informed 
choice.157 
c. The prohibition of exculpatory language in an informed consent form 
The RPs argued one additional caveat of the Common Rule.  They 
challenged the validity of the informed consent forms in Catalona because 
they contained exculpatory language prohibited by the Common Rule.158  The 
Common Rule states: 
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory 
language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or 
appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to 
 
 148. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1789. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1787. 
 153. Id. at 1787. 
 154. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787. 
 155. Clayton, supra note 117, at 19. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 19-20. 
 158. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 998 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
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release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability 
for negligence.159 
The court, however, concluded that prohibition of exculpatory language 
applied only to waivers of legal rights due to negligence, not to the property 
issue in Catalona.160  Curiously, though, the OHRP listed guidance on its 
website which provides examples of exculpatory language.161  Two improper 
examples are: 
1. I voluntarily and freely donate any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples 
to the U.S. Government and hereby relinquish all right, title, and interest to 
said items. 
2. By consent to participate in this research, I give up any property rights I may 
have in bodily fluids or tissue samples obtained in the course of the 
research.162 
These two examples, the second in particular, seems to refute the court’s 
conclusion that the prohibition on exculpatory language does not apply to 
property rights.  The discrepancy has not been resolved, and researchers are 
still left with the question as to whether informed consent forms can affect 
property rights.  Another Common Rule provision remains to be examined, 
however: the right to discontinue participation.163 
2. Right to discontinue participation—what happens to prior donated 
samples? 
The Common Rule states that one of the requirements of informed consent 
is to provide each subject with information including a statement that 
“participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss 
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may 
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefit,” and it 
also states that the RPs must be provided with information concerning “[t]he 
consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw from the research and 
procedures for orderly termination of participation by the subject.”164  In 
Catalona, the informed consent forms also provided for withdrawal from 
research, stating that an RP “may choose not to participate in this research 
study or withdraw your consent at any time.”165 
 
 159. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 160. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 161. Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), “Exculpatory Language” in Informed 
Consent, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2007). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 164. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (1991); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(4) (1991). 
 165. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
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However, as the Catalona court correctly noted: “The federal regulations 
do not address the matter of a RP’s ‘right’ to physically possess their samples 
upon termination of their participation in a research study; or, a ‘right’ to direct 
their sample[s] transfer to another institution or Principal Investigator.”166  
Indeed, the informed consent forms, too, are silent on the issue of whether RPs 
can withdraw their previously-donated samples or transfer them to another 
facility.167 
Catalona and the RPs argued that the right to withdraw from participation 
found in the Common Rule included the right to withdraw prior donated 
samples.168  The RPs, in essence, were arguing that if property ownership was 
viewed as a bundle of sticks, then they would still hold at least one (the right to 
withdraw); therefore, WU would not have complete property rights over the 
samples.  The court disagreed and concluded that the right to withdraw meant 
only that the RP could decide not to provide any more samples; it did not affect 
prior samples.169  On appeal in the Eighth Circuit, during oral arguments, WU 
responded to the RPs’ argument by distinguishing the right to withdraw as a 
privacy right, not a property right.170  The Common Rule would allow WU to 
either destroy the samples or anonymize them.171  Anonymizing the samples 
would protect the donor’s privacy, not a property right.  Therefore, WU argued 
destruction of the samples must have the same purpose.172  Thus, the Eighth 
Circuit now has an additional argument to consider, but given that the district 
court found for WU, the conclusion should not change—the right to withdraw 
does not include the right to retrieve prior samples. 
VI.  LEGAL PRECEDENT INVOLVING TISSUES IN RESEARCH—SCARCE, ONLY 
TWO SIMILAR YET DISTINGUISHABLE CASES 
Only two relevant cases exist concerning the donation of biological 
materials for research purposes.  According to Catalona, there was a “scarcity 
of legal precedent to assist” in situations involving ownership of biological 
materials donated for research, and there were only two cases: Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California and Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
 
 166. Id. at 992. 
 167. Id. at 990. 
 168. Id. at 999. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Recording of Oral Argument, Washington Univ. v. Catalona No. 06-2286, No. 06-2301 
(8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2007). 
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Hospital Research Institute, Inc.173  With a dearth of cases concerning the 
issue, these two opinions must be carefully examined to ensure consistency 
with federal regulations, as the Catalona court did here.174  In short, both cases 
found the RPs to be donors who lost all ownership rights in their samples once 
donated.175  Likewise, the Catalona court was persuaded to apply the same 
reasoning, although the cases were easily distinguishable.176 
A. Moore v. Regents of the University of California 
In Moore,177 the court had to determine whether the plaintiff, Moore, 
stated a cause of action of conversion against Golde (the physician), Quan (a 
university researcher), regents (owners and operators of the university) and 
others.178  Moore, diagnosed with the rare disease hairy cell leukemia,179 went 
to Golde for treatment.180  Golde told Moore “that he had reason to fear for his 
life,” and he proposed a splenectomy.181  Golde and Quan decided to take the 
excised spleen and use it for research purposes, without informing Moore.182  
Further, Golde asked Moore to return to the medical center several times over 
the next seven years to give samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow 
aspirate, and sperm, under the guise that it was necessary for his health.183  
During this time, the samples were actually needed so that Golde could 
continue his research and exploit the cells.184  Golde and Quan subsequently 
obtained a patent for a cell line created from Moore’s samples.185 
The opinion addressed two issues: 1) fiduciary duty and informed consent, 
and 2) conversion.186  In the former, the court examined whether the physician 
had a duty to acquire the patient’s informed consent and whether the physician 
 
 173. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (referencing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) and Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003)). 
 174. See id. at 995-97. 
 175. Id. at 997. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  For an in-depth 
overview of the case, see Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6. 
 178. Moore, 793 P.2d at 480-81. 
 179. The disease is called “hairy” cell leukemia because when examined under a microscope, 
the cells look hairy.  National Cancer Institute, General Information About Hairy Cell Leukemia, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancerinfo/pdq/treatment/hairy-cell-leukemia/patient/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2006). 
 180. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 482. 
 186. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483, 487.  Conversion is “a tort that protects against interference 
with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.”  Id. at 487. 
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had a duty to disclose his research intentions and his economic interests prior 
to conducting the medical procedures.187  In the second issue, the court 
examined the patient’s conversion claim, where the patient argued that he 
continued to own his samples following removal, and that he never consented 
to their use.188 
1. Fiduciary duty and informed consent 
The patient, Moore, alleged that Golde failed to disclose his research and 
economic interests before obtaining consent to use the samples.189  A physician 
has a duty to disclose personal interests that may bias professional judgment, 
and a failure to do so results in a cause of action for performing medical 
procedures without informed consent.190  Golde argued that the scientific use 
of cells already removed cannot affect the health of a patient.191  However, the 
court stated that a physician with a research interest may, perhaps 
subconsciously, recommend a procedure that might not be in the patient’s best 
interest.192  The court held that a physician must, when obtaining informed 
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health.193 
2. Conversion 
In his claim for conversion, the patient argued that he continued to own his 
samples following removal, and that he never consented to their use.194  The 
patient further claimed that as a result of the conversion, he had a proprietary 
interest in each product ever created from his cells.195  The court noted, 
however, that if the patient won the conversion argument, a duty would be 
imposed on researchers to investigate every human sample ever used in their 
research.196  Further, since Moore did not expect to retain possession of his 
cells after removal, then in order to sue for conversion, he must have retained 
some other ownership interest in them.197  However, the California Health and 
Safety Code dictated the disposition of human biological materials based on 
policy goals, not the law of personal property.198  The policy goals were to 
ensure safe handling of hazardous waste materials, not to compensate donors; 
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once the policy goal is recognized, the practical effect is that what is left does 
not constitute a property interest for the purposes of conversion.199  The Moore 
court concluded its conversion analysis by stating that the cell line cannot be 
the patient’s property because it is “both factually and legally distinct” from 
his donated cells.200 
3. Application of Moore v. Regents to Washington University v. Catalona 
Moore can be distinguished from Catalona in several important respects.  
First, in Moore the facts involved a cell line created from donations, whereas 
Catalona involved the donations themselves.  Next, unlike Moore where the 
physician did not disclose his research interests, in Catalona there was no 
question whether the RPs knew what would become of their tissue (although it 
may be cloudy as to whether they thought their tissues could still be used after 
they exercised their rights to withdraw).  Further, although the Moore court 
stated that a physician might subconsciously recommend a procedure not in the 
patient’s best interest, factual distinctions also exist between Moore and 
Catalona.  In Moore, many of the procedures performed by Golde had no 
purpose other than research.  In Catalona, however, there was no question that 
the RPs needed the surgeries for cancer treatment.  Moreover, in Moore the 
physician and RPs were on opposing sides, whereas here Catalona and the RPs 
want the same thing. 
Further, with respect to the conversion argument, similarities exist between 
Moore and Catalona.  In Moore, the court noted that the patient did not expect 
to retain possession of the cells, just like the RPs in Catalona.  Further, in 
Moore the court followed the California Health and Safety Code to determine 
the disposition of the samples, not general property law.  Although the 
Catalona court followed similar federal and state (Missouri) health and safety 
codes, it placed more emphasis on the role of general property laws.  In the 
end, the Catalona court took from Moore that a research participant/donor did 
not retain any ownership rights in the samples after the donation of the 
biological materials.201 
B. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc. 
In Greenberg,202 donors of human biological materials sued 
physician/researcher Dr. Matalon (Matalon), who used the donated samples to 
isolate a gene which he then attempted to patent.203  The donors claimed the 
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purpose of their donations was to further research of Canavan disease, hoping 
to lead to prenatal testing for the disease as well as carrier detection which 
would benefit the public at large.204  The donors’ intent was not for the 
samples to be used for profit-motives that limit research.205  Matalon 
successfully isolated the gene and, unbeknownst to the donors, filed a patent 
application for his discovery.206  Once granted, Matalon (and other defendants) 
had the power to restrict any research related to that gene by any other 
researchers.207  In fact, Matalon exercised that right with threats, and then 
allowed access to the gene only through licensing agreements which charged 
royalty fees.208 
The donors filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, lack of informed consent 
and conversion.209  The plaintiffs’ argument for lack of informed consent 
revolved around the defendants’ failure to disclose the intent to patent and 
profit off the donations.210  The court disagreed and refused to extend informed 
consent in that manner.211 
The plaintiffs’ argument for conversion centered on their claim that the 
defendants deprived them of a property interest in their body tissue.212  The 
court disagreed, stating, “These were donations to research without any 
contemporaneous expectations of return of the body tissues and genetic 
samples, and thus conversion does not lie as a cause of action.”213  The court 
recognized that for a conversion claim, the plaintiffs must have had a property 
interest, which they lacked.214  Further, the property right in biological tissue 
samples “evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party.”215  
Thus, the court concluded that the donors had no claim for conversion.216 
Ann important factual distinction arises between Greenberg and Catalona.  
In Greenberg, the court recognized that the “patented result of research is ‘both 
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factually and legally distinct’ from excised material used in the research.”217  
In Catalona, however, the tissues were not  altered—only stored—with no 
evidence of commercial intent218 which, may limit the applicability of 
Greenberg.  Nonetheless, in Catalona, the court followed the advice of 
Greenberg, asserting that the RPs were donors who voluntarily gave up 
ownership rights in their biological materials upon donation.219 
VII.  PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS—THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE PATIENT’S 
RIGHT TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION AND THE RIGHT TO PROTECT 
RESEARCH THAT FURTHERS SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 
In Moore, the court analyzed the policy issues concerning donations of 
biological materials as a battle between two considerations.220  The first issue 
is the protection of the RP’s right to make autonomous medical decisions.221  
Second, research must be protected; innocent researchers merely engaging in 
socially useful activities should not be threatened with “disabling civil 
liability” when they have no reason to believe their use of a sample is against 
the donor’s wishes.222  The Moore court stated that these two policy 
considerations must be balanced, but noted that it may be more important to 
remove uncertainty rather than necessarily finding the best balance.223  The 
two policy considerations must be examined. 
A. The Research Participant’s Right to Make an Informed Medical Decision 
Individuals have the right to make informed decisions about their health.  
The Common Rule’s informed consent provision states as much.224  It is 
doubtful that anyone would object to the idea that a person has a right to 
dictate what happens to their body, and that right is more important than 
conducting research.  The Consensus Statement warned, “[D]espite the 
desirability of increased knowledge, research [must not] risk harming the 
individuals who are being studied.”225  Logically, then, as the Moore court 
stated, a remedy should exist “when physicians act with undisclosed motives 
that may affect their professional judgment.”226 
However, the issue is clouded when instead of research on a person’s own 
body, the research concerns a tissue sample that has already been excised and 
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stored.  For samples that were taken with a specific research purpose in mind, 
consent would be easy to obtain from the donor for that specific project.  With 
stored tissue banks, although the donor was initially told about the purposes of 
the donation, as time passes, circumstances change.  A different research 
project might need samples.  Where else would a researcher look but to a 
biobank?  Researchers may not be intentionally disobeying the donors’ wishes, 
and they generally want to gather as much information as possible to advance 
research.227  However, in all the excitement, sometimes researchers do not 
think about the consequences.228  When researchers’ activities do not 
correspond with the donors’ expectations, the trust between researcher and 
donor is eroded.  As Clayton put it: 
  More attention also needs to be paid to restoring the public trust in 
research.  A greater commitment to seeking informed consent is one way, but 
so is a more far reaching and transparent discussion of the goals and benefits of 
research.  Part of the distrust also results from public perception that someone 
else is making money out of something that is ‘theirs.’229 
Of course, some might argue that the tissue no longer belongs to the donor.  It 
is clear, however, that the RPs have a right be informed of their rights prior to 
donating a sample. 
B. Protecting Research: The Researcher’s Right to Perform Important 
Medical Research 
Undoubtedly, medical research is a good thing.  As the Consensus 
Statement argued, “Increasing the fund of knowledge generally is . . . good 
both for society and for the individuals whose care is improved by more 
complete understanding.  Society rightly values research and the contributions 
of those who participate as subjects in research.”230  Thus, a researcher should 
have the right to perform such research, but some important caveats must 
simultaneously be recognized. 
First, researchers must be allowed to use stored biological materials for 
medical research.  A report from the NBAC noted, “Biomedical research 
routinely relies on the availability of stored human biological materials as well 
as the willingness of individuals to participate in research protocols by 
donating blood, tissue, or DNA samples to research.”231  Further, stored tissue 
is invaluable in cancer research: 
[T]he availability of large archives of carefully documented and clinically 
correlated specimens has permitted researchers to apply directly new detection 
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technologies to existing biological materials.  This is a far more rapid and less 
expensive approach than initiating new prospective studies for each new 
promising candidate gene for many of the varieties of human cancer.  
Conducting such studies not only would be extraordinarily costly in terms of 
dollars and human effort, but would require study periods of many years, or 
even decades.232 
Thus, there is a need for stored tissue samples. 
Second, unrestricted access to tissues is important.233  Some examples of 
restrictions include clauses such as, “you can use my tissues for this research, 
not that research,” or “don’t commercialize them, or do, and give me a cut.”234 
As of now, researchers generally have the access they want, but they fear that 
restrictions might slow research.235  “Many scientists depend on access to 
tissues without the burden of restrictions that donors might make.”236  Of 
particular concern are financial restrictions by the donor, because they could 
threaten the sharing of tissue for research purposes by withholding access for 
money.237  Researchers worry that it could destroy their financial incentive to 
do research because donors would hold out for a large cut.238  Nonetheless, “a 
growing number of activists — ethicists, lawyers, doctors and patients — are 
arguing cases and pushing for federal regulations that would change the status 
quo by granting people rights to control their tissues.”239 
The practical implications of granting donors more rights must be 
considered.  At the time of a donation to a stored tissue bank, the research use 
of that tissue is unlikely to be known.  Later, when the tissue is allocated for a 
particular research project, it would not be practical to disclose every research 
detail or every possibility of economic benefit to a potential donor—even if 
that donor could be found.  The court in Greenberg noted that it would be 
“unworkable and would chill medical research as it would mandate that 
researchers constantly evaluate whether a disclosable event has occurred.”240  
Similarly, when Moore was decided, lawyers worried that a victory for donors 
would “create chaos for researchers” and “[sound] the death knell to the 
university physician-scientist.”241  Moreover, granting donors additional rights 
would give rise to a type of “dead-hand control that research subjects could 
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hold because they would be able to dictate how medical research 
progresses.”242 
An additional concern is that perhaps the rights of donors have been 
overstated.  As Skloot stated, “Scientists aren’t stealing your arm or some vital 
organ. They’re just using tissue scraps you parted with voluntarily.”243  
Further, in Greenberg, the court stated that “these Plaintiffs are more 
accurately portrayed as donors rather than objects of human experimentation, 
and thus the voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different 
treatment.”244 
In Catalona, the court had the last say involving policy concerns.  The 
court noted: 
The safety and welfare of human subject participants is protected through a 
variety of legal and professional standards administered by committees of 
persons schooled in the fields most privy to the needs of the medical/science 
community. Medical research can only advance if access to these materials to 
the scientific community is not thwarted by private agendas. If left unregulated 
and to the whims of a RP, these highly-prized biological materials would 
become nothing more than chattel going to the highest bidder. It would no 
longer be a question of the importance of the research protocol to public 
health, but rather who can pay the most. Selling excised tissue or DNA on E-
Bay would become as commonplace as selling your old television on E-Bay. 
The integrity and utility of all biorepositories would be seriously threatened if 
RPs could move their samples from institution to institution any time they 
wanted. No longer could research protocols rely on aggregate collections since 
individual samples would come and go. Accountability would no longer exist 
since institutions would merely be warehouses filling purchase orders. 
  More alarming is the great potential for prejudicial influences into medical 
research. Allowing an RP to choose who can have the sample, where the 
sample will be stored, and/or how the sample can be used is tantamount to a 
blood donor being able to dictate that his/her blood can only be transfused into 
a person of a certain ethnic background, or a donated kidney being 
transplanted only into a woman or man. This kind of “selectiveness” is 
repugnant to any ethical code which promotes medical research to help all of 
mankind.245 
Thus, the district court was concerned about private agendas—some 
financial—as well as the availability of samples in a stored tissue bank that 
could be relied on.  In essence, the court was concerned that research could 
come to a screeching halt. 
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VIII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In sum, in Catalona, RPs who donated prostate tissue excised during 
cancer surgery at Washington University attempted to transfer that tissue to 
Northwestern University.246  The case revolves around ownership of these 
samples.  The district court had no choice but to treat the tissue samples as 
personal property, with little discretion.  The district court’s decision in 
Catalona has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.247  The Eighth Circuit should surprise no one when it affirms.  In fact, 
the opinion could be all of one sentence,248 stating, “We find WU to be the 
owner of these samples, as it had exclusive possession and control following 
the RPs voluntarily donations of the tissue samples.” 
WU unquestionably had exclusive possession and control over the 
samples, and the RPs could not meet their burden of showing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that they were the rightful owners.  The RPs’ 
best response—that the donations were merely bailments—borders on the 
absurd.  A bailment, by definition, requires an expectation of return.249  Any 
analogy to a delivery service like UPS, Federal Express, or DHL is worthless 
because in those instances, the customer expects the package to be delivered 
somewhere.  Also, the last time someone shipped a package via UPS, did they 
“donate” it?  Of course not.  Here, the RPs had no expectation that the samples 
were to be delivered or returned anywhere.  Logic and reason support that 
conclusion—the RPs wanted to give away their tissue, with no further rights or 
obligations, in the hopes that someone would benefit.  They knew, or should 
have known, that WU would become the new owner of the samples; the 
informed consent forms had the WU logo and used the term “donation.” 
Although federal regulations on biologic materials complicate these issues, 
the result will be unchanged.  The most important purpose of informed consent 
is to protect the donor’s health and safety.  Here the health and safety concern 
is a minimal issue because the tissues were excised in a necessary surgical 
procedure for prostate cancer, and there are no significant non-physical risks 
(undoubtedly making this discussion quite narrow in scope).  The RPs would 
have the surgeries regardless of whether the resulting tissue was donated for 
research or simply destroyed.  Further, their “right to withdraw” should be read 
logically; it means that a donor has the right to stop donating more tissue at any 
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time, without regard to prior donations.  Informed consent is a mechanism to 
protect the donor’s health and safety, nothing more. 
Moreover, the RPs are not really a party in interest; Catalona is using his 
patients to get access to tissues that he wants.  Do the patients really care who 
uses the samples?  Maybe a little, but it is probably not as much as their 
lawyers want people to think.  The RPs want to eradicate prostate cancer so 
that those who come after them can avoid what they had to go through.  
Regardless of who owns the tissue samples, no one suggested that they would 
not eventually be used for research on prostate cancer.  That use seems to fall 
in line with the RPs’ wishes. 
So, what is this case about, really?  It is about money, or at least the future 
ability to earn it.  True, no one argued that the RPs or Catalona had any 
financial motive for the lawsuit.  But there are financial incentives to perform 
research.  Successful research equals money, not only from private companies 
but also to obtain grants from the federal government.  Further, it is not the 
RPs who truly want money; when they made their donations, they thought the 
tissues were valueless.  They were right, of course; the tissues were valueless, 
and they will continue to be valueless until researchers find a way to utilize 
them.  Sure, the donors might be tempted by greed once they see that their 
tissues were turned into a valuable product, but this is no different than selling 
paint to Picasso—it was worthless until he converted it into a masterpiece.  
Also, public policy dictates that the RPs should not be allowed to sell their 
tissue to the highest bidder.  If they were allowed to do so, researchers could 
no longer count on the availability of samples collected.  Further, the 
administrative hardship that it would create would be a disincentive to 
maintain biobanks for medical research, which is the opposite of the societal 
goal of medical research. 
However, even a reversal would probably not rattle the research world as 
some suggest, leading back to the original question: Will this case “shape the 
evolving law of research on body tissue?”250  It will not.  The holding in this 
case is not what makes it important; it will be easily distinguished, much like 
Moore and Greenberg were. 
What makes the case so important is that it creates discussion about serious 
issues involving research in the 21st Century.  Would the RPs have had a 
problem with the disposition of their samples if they knew ahead of time that 
WU would own them free and clear?  Doubtful.  The importance of this case is 
to teach researchers and institutions about the consequences of communication 
failures in respect to ownership of research samples.  In theory, the rightful 
owner of the tissue samples should be the one who will best use them.  This is 
not a question that a court can decide; it is a question best left to experts, like 
WU and Northwestern University.  The universities could have collaborated to 
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come up with mankind’s best solution in a mutually profitable way.  Instead, a 
lawsuit seemed more appropriate to them.  Now, the RPs’ outcry in this case 
has swelled more than their prostates ever did. 
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